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6. Climate Migration Is about 
People, Not Numbers
D. Durand-Delacre, G. Bettini, S. L. Nash, H. Sterly, G. 
Gioli, E. Hut, I. Boas, C. Farbotko, P. Sakdapolrak, M. de 
Bruijn, B. Tripathy Furlong, K. van der Geest,  
S. Lietaer and M. Hulme
It has become increasingly common to argue that climate change 
will lead to mass migrations. In this chapter, we examine the large 
numbers often invoked to underline alarming climate migration 
narratives. We outline the methodological limitations to their 
production. We argue for a greater diversity of knowledges about 
climate migration, rooted in qualitative and mixed methods. We 
also question the usefulness of numbers to progressive agendas 
for climate action. Large numbers are used for rhetorical effect to 
create fear of climate migration, but this approach backfires when 
they are used to justify security-oriented, anti-migrant agendas. In 
addition, quantification helps present migration as a management 
problem with decisions based on meeting quantitative targets, 
instead of prioritising peoples’ needs, rights, and freedoms. 
Introduction
Perhaps counterintuitively—in a volume calling for actions to tackle the 
climate crisis—this contribution cautions against the casual use of one of 
the primary narratives through which the climate crisis is signified and 
urgent action invoked. That is, the dramatic estimates and projections of 
a looming migration crisis caused by climate change. We problematise 
the numbers through which the spectre of such a crisis is supported and 
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communicated. Our critique of these numbers takes place on several 
levels. We begin by pointing to the many methodological challenges 
in producing robust numbers. Estimates remain imprecise and highly 
uncertain, despite some significant developments in methods and 
datasets. We also diagnose more fundamental epistemological issues 
about the kinds of knowledges required to understand the climate-
migration nexus. Numbers and quantitative estimates fail to capture 
crucial dimensions of human mobility. Migrants’ decisions to move 
can be forced but also voluntary, are highly subjective, and need to be 
understood as situated, political, and non-deterministic. 
Ultimately, however, our concern has less to do with what numbers 
can or cannot tell us about climate migration than with the ways 
in which numbers are (mis)used. On the one hand, a focus on mass 
migration numbers is intended to construct climate migration as a 
crisis. However, framing this crisis as a humanitarian issue has done 
little to protect migrants and more to stoke the fires of anti-immigrant 
populism, providing arguments for more stringent border controls and 
increasingly restrictive migration policies across the Global North. At 
the same time, the promise of quantification creates the impression 
that this crisis can be clearly defined, and managed, as long as better 
numbers are made available (also see Hannis, this volume). Attempts 
to use numbers to address issues of climate justice and responsibility 
are undercut by the focus on quantification itself, which tends to limit 
debates to technical questions about how many will move and how this 
movement can be organised.
This critique of headline estimates should not be misinterpreted as 
a denial of the impacts that climate change is having and will continue 
to have on peoples’ mobilities. Climate change impacts related to sea-
level rise, drought, increased frequency of wildfires and storms—and 
the associated declines in livelihoods—pose serious and differentiated 
challenges with which we must contend (as also highlighted by 
Lendelvo et al., this volume). Rather, our aim is to point to how a focus 
on numbers reduces political imaginaries of our response to climate 
migration to a narrow range of possibilities. We argue that a different 
approach is needed.
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A Brief Overview of Climate Migration Numbers and 
their Methodological Limitations
The environmentalist Norman Myers (1934–2019) initiated efforts to 
estimate the impact of climate change on migration when he predicted in 
the early 1990s that there would be 150 million “environmental refugees” 
by 2050 (Myers 1993). He later updated his estimate to 200 million by 
2050 (Myers and Kent 1995; Myers 1997, 2002). The latter figure remains 
one of the most widely cited climate migration numbers to date. Myers’ 
estimations were based on linear extrapolations of demographic and 
displacement figures in what he considered “environmental hotspots”. 
These methods were rapidly challenged as too simplistic, notably 
because they assumed a linear relationship between environmental 
impacts (such as sea-level rise or desertification) and out-migration 
from affected areas. They were also not based on any actual inquiry into 
the causal mechanisms involved and ignored potential in-situ adaptation 
strategies. Myers’ approach relied on aggregate global forecasts, rather 
than specific case studies that could bring empirical grounding to these 
assumptions (Black 1994, 2001; Suhrke 1994; Castles 2002). Myers’ 
numbers have been reproduced in many prominent reports since their 
publication (as critiqued by Saunders 2000). More recently, numbers 
larger than a billion people have also been disseminated in academic 
articles, NGO or think tank reports, and the press (see Table 1). Myers 
himself later admitted that coming up with the final estimates required 
“heroic extrapolations” (Brown 2008).
Despite this situation, many subsequent reports—mostly published 
by NGOs and (inter)governmental organisations—either reproduced 
Myers’ numbers or provided other estimates based on analogous 
methods (see methodological notes in Table 1). These numbers are 
rounded to the nearest ten or hundred million, an indication of the 
crude methods employed to derive them. Most problematic is the 
prevalence of simple additions of annual figures and an extrapolation 
of such trends into the future, which can produce nothing other than 
a continuously rising graph (for a recent example, see Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2020).
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Recognising the deep flaws in the methods employed to derive these 
numbers, quantitative social scientists and modellers have sought 
to develop more sophisticated datasets and methods to improve the 
credibility of numerical estimates. In doing this, they contend with the 
unavailability of data, particularly at small scales or in disaggregated 
form, its poor quality, and its limited comparability (Brown 2008; Tejero 
et al. 2020). On the condition that the necessary data could be gathered, 
reviewers of the field have repeatedly emphasised the need for more 
longitudinal studies, a multi-scalar research, analysis disaggregated 
along gender, age, ethnic, caste, and class lines, and consideration of a 
wider range of environmental drivers beyond precipitation changes or 
sea-level rise (Brown 2008; Piguet 2010; Obokata et al. 2014; Vinke and 
Hoffmann 2020). 
As a result of these responses, some refinements to datasets and 
methods have been made. Most researchers also now present overall 
climate migration numbers with much greater care than was the case 
for earlier estimates. They largely acknowledge limitations and warn 
readers not to overinterpret results by pointing to numerical ranges 
and associated uncertainties. Nonetheless, reviews and meta-analyses 
of quantitative studies still conclude that many analytical problems 
persist. They find that models allow few confident causal claims about 
the environment’s influence on migration except “in broad terms and 
at fairly large spatial scales” (Obokata et al. 2014: 127); and that results 
remain heavily influenced by the methods used. Ultimately, they find it 
remains exceedingly difficult for modellers to defend any single factor 
as the primary driver of migration (Piguet et al. 2011; McLeman 2013; 
Obokata et al. 2014; Beine and Jeusette 2018; Cattaneo et al. 2019). In 
other words, it remains extremely difficult to definitely link migration 
to climate change.
A Greater Diversity of Knowledges of Climate 
Migration Is Needed
In addition to these methodological shortcomings, a focus on climate 
migration numbers obscures the need for other forms of knowledge 
about the climate-migration nexus. Producing these knowledges 
requires more use of mixed and qualitative methods. These are better 
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suited than quantification alone to study the multi-causal, highly 
situated, and subjective dimensions of climate migration. Attempts 
to isolate migration drivers related to climate change, and to identify 
and count ‘climate migrants’, are at odds with most social scientists’ 
understanding of migration. From a social science perspective, human 
mobility is well-accepted to be a multi-causal and complex phenomenon. 
This implies that migration drivers—be they social, political, economic, 
environmental, or demographic—interact with and mutually influence 
each other (Black et al. 2011).
Our trouble with numbers is also motivated by fundamental 
questions on how migration itself should be understood. Attempting 
to reduce migration to a number is akin to the “migration map trap” 
whereby individual experiences of migration become “faceless pixel[s] 
in a big threatening arrow” (Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2020: 210). 
This approach not only overlooks the situated complexities already 
highlighted, but also obliterates the important subjective dimensions of 
migration.
To be clear, accounting for those subjective dimensions is not merely 
about looking at the faces behind the numbers. The problem with 
this methodological ‘reversal’ would be to individualise processes 
that are in fact emergent and collective, thereby interpreting peoples’ 
experiences and extrapolating singular stories as representative of 
millions. Rather, we suggest that it is important to fully acknowledge 
that mobility itself is a cultural construct, and that distinct ontologies 
and epistemologies of mobility are embodied in and inform migrants’ 
choices and experiences (also see Sullivan Chapter 3, and Dieckmann’s 
chapter, this volume on the relevance of ontological concerns for 
situating choices and understanding). This subjective dimension of 
migration stresses its non-deterministic character and, in line with 
a general shift in migration studies, calls into question the dominant 
focus on ‘root causes’ and migration ‘management’. Viewing migration 
and mobilities as autonomous (which is not a synonym for voluntary 
or individual) practices suggests that they must be investigated well 
beyond institutional constraints and categories (De Genova and Peutz 
2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Scheel 2013).
In practical terms, we are calling for approaches that engage with the 
subjective diversity of migrant mobilities and situate people involved 
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and their perspectives more prominently in the research process (Casas‐
Cortes et al. 2015). This orientation requires deep qualitative work—
usually based on interviews and ethnographic fieldwork—and a general 
move away from an emphasis on legal and governmental frameworks 
and the economic determinism of the labour market.
A Climate Mobilities Approach to Diverse and  
Situated Mobilities
A climate mobilities approach is a promising way to understand the 
mechanisms behind the decision to migrate (or to stay) (Boas et al. 
2019). This approach, based largely on qualitative research, does not 
aim to cut through causality and isolate ‘the environment’ from other 
‘contextual’ factors, or to identify the dominant factor in migration 
decisions. Instead, it considers causation as always multi-faceted, 
situated, and nonlinear. The changing climate remains a relevant factor, 
but climate only exerts its influence on the world through the matrix 
of social, economic, environmental, cultural, historical, and political 
processes that comprise the social world (Hulme 2011). In this way, 
the climate is not privileged as an influence on mobilities but is also 
recognised as a pluralistic phenomenon worthy of multi-pronged 
empirical investigations.
These investigations need to be pursued using a rich vocabulary 
capturing the many nuances and forms that (im)mobilities take. 
Indeed, social science research has shown that climate mobilities can 
be short-term or long-term, but also circular or seasonal (Zickgraf 
2018). What may start as a short-distance, temporary move can turn 
into a long-distance, permanent one (Van der Geest 2010). Some people 
choose to remain in their homes in full cognisance of the risks involved 
(McNamara and Gibson 2009; Adams 2016; Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016; 
Farbotko 2018), while others are trapped and experience involuntary 
immobility (Black et al. 2013), or embark on long-distance movements 
because everyday short-distance mobilities to markets or healthcare are 
disrupted (Blondin 2020). In addition, it is crucial to understand the 
situated dynamics and local contexts in which migration (or immobility) 
occurs. Socio-cultural, political, and environmental dynamics change 
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from place to place, and can differ significantly even within a single 
community.
To better understand the complexity of migratory movements, we 
can also turn for example to “trajectory ethnographies” (Schapendonk 
and Steel 2014; Schapendonk et al. 2018), “geographies in and of 
movement” (Brachet 2012), or life history approaches (Singh et al. 2019). 
These in-depth approaches study how mobility unfolds, what shapes it, 
and how mobility decisions are made. The first two involve interviews 
in multiple locations, at different moments and stages relevant to a 
journey, while the latter explores personal narratives of mobility. Such 
methods provide a detailed picture of the circuitous routes people take; 
of the obstacles, meetings, and separations that punctuate them; and of 
peoples’ perceptions, aspirations, and memories. 
Of course, such methods also have their limitations. Questions 
can be raised about the power dynamics between researchers and 
research participants, and the latter’s degree of representation (Cabot 
2016; Khosravi 2018; Boas et al. 2020). Can we—as often privileged 
academics—really put ourselves in the shoes of affected individuals? 
Trajectory approaches allow researchers (to some degree) “to practice 
mobility and to reveal mobility-immobility relations that otherwise 
would remain hidden”, but it is important to stay reflexive (Boas et al. 
2020: 144).
This is not to say that better numbers cannot be produced in the 
course of estimating climate change and migration interconnections. 
Besides improving quantitative methods and data, however, we argue 
that progress will only be achieved through greater collaboration 
with qualitative social sciences of the kind just described. We see as 
promising the mixing of methods in work that ‘grounds’ big data with 
site-based fieldwork, so as to challenge assumptions made from afar and 
detect important dynamics that big-data research would otherwise miss 
(Boas et al. 2019). Collaborative work integrating behavioural migration 
theories and concepts of “place attachment” into agent-based models 
is also helping to increase the sensitivity of model results to variations 
in individual and community-level responses to environmental hazards 
(Adams and Kay 2019). Lastly, the recent uptake in mobilities research 
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of tools such as Q methodology1 also reveals a range of shared subjective 
understandings, attitudes and perceptions of climate change and human 
mobility (Van der Geest et al. 2019; Oakes 2019).
The Misuses of Climate Migration Numbers
If we insist on epistemological and methodological diversity beyond 
quantification alone, it is because social science studies on numbers—
not just of climate migration but in other spheres too—have repeatedly 
shown their potential for misuse (Porter 1995). The point is not to 
do away with numbers, but to exercise caution at all stages of their 
production, communication, and use. Below we detail two specific areas 
of concern.
Climate Mobility Is Not a Crisis
Our first concern with headline numbers is how they are used to 
construct climate migration as a crisis. The intention behind such 
rhetoric may be laudable: to stimulate action on climate change and to 
assist its victims. But there are many problems with using fear of mass 
displacement as a rallying cry. There is absolutely no guarantee that 
crisis narratives underpinned by large numbers are an effective way to 
achieve these aims.
On the contrary, press releases and the news media tend to 
highlight a single number, usually drawn from the upper range of 
estimates presented in the original source. In some cases, the numbers 
lose all specificity, with headlines pointing only to ‘millions’ or even 
‘billions’ of people on the move (also see discussion of the constructed 
and historical dimensions of ‘environmental refugees’ in Saunders 
2000). Sometimes, they do not even refer to a specific source. In such 
a discursive context, the specifics of the number and the underlying 
1 The aim of Q methodology is to identify the shared views of study participants on 
a given issue. Participants are asked, as a group, to rank a set of statements on a 
scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The statements are selected to 
be representative of known existing opinions on the issue. In addition, participants 
are asked to explain their decisions, providing qualitative commentary to the 
quantitative sorting exercise.
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methodology matter little, as long as it is high. Numbers are used to 
rhetorical effect.
The dystopian futures thus created are often associated with a 
tendency to discuss migratory flows in hydrological metaphors, such 
as in assertions of ‘waves’, ‘floods’ or ‘rising tides’ of migrants. Such 
invocations connect with a wider racist motif that contributes to an 
alarming imaginary wherein the ‘Global North’ will be overwhelmed 
by migrants from ‘Global South’ contexts (Bettini 2013; Methmann 2014; 
Pallister-Wilkins 2019). Worse still, the ‘hotspots’ approach on which 
these narratives are based tends to erase colonial histories and naturalise 
structural violence, neutralising local contexts and conditions. By 
reducing large parts of the Global South to a “hotspot”, this perpetuates 
a dangerous othering exercise, denigrating large parts of the world as 
merely disaster-ridden, dangerous, overpopulated places from which 
people can only aspire to flee (Giuliani 2017). This narrative actively 
reproduces the figure of the climate migrant as a security threat, and 
ultimately, as a highly racialised entity (Baldwin 2013).
Researchers who seek to publicise their work on the climate-
migration nexus must grasp these racist and simplifying dangers, as 
too should policymakers, practitioners, and journalists who promote 
these narratives. We argue that the stories of affected people ought to 
be central in such reporting, even if—perhaps especially if—their stories 
run counter to our intuitions and estimated numbers. It is people who 
matter, not numbers.
Climate Mobility Is Not a Management Problem
The promise of better numbers also reinforces the impression that the 
climate migration crisis can be managed because it can be quantified. 
Numbers hold a privileged place in contemporary political discourses 
and policymaking, as they are associated with rigour and objectivity in 
the public and scientific imagination (Porter 1995; Espeland and Stevens 
2008; Hansen and Porter 2012). Migration policy has not escaped 
this trend. To a large extent migration expertise is understood to be 
associated with researchers’ ability to quantify their findings, so they 
can be used in managerial practices that place statistical methods at the 
74 Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
centre of decision-making (Takle 2017). While numbers have their place 
in policymaking, we argue that the qualitative methods and subjective 
perspectives highlighted above should be centred in policymaking on 
climate mobilities. This will only be possible if the rhetorical power of 
numbers is acknowledged and challenged.
Adopting a managerial approach to climate migration, guided by 
flawed numbers, risks disregarding many of the dangers associated 
with climate migration numbers discussed above. This practice can 
be understood in terms of “strategic ignorance”. While policymakers 
are widely aware of migration data quality issues, and associated 
uncertainties, they still maintain a picture of migration as an “easily 
measurable, intelligible reality” that can therefore be managed by 
numbers (Scheel and Ustek-Spilda 2019). In this way, they avoid the 
difficult political questions—notably around responsibility—that a 
more head-on engagement with migration’s complex realities would 
require (Betts and Pilath 2017; Kelman 2019).
In a political context where critical migration scholars struggle 
to make themselves heard, this situation is particularly concerning. 
Mobilities scholars often find that while many policymakers are willing 
to engage in discussion, these exchanges do not have any meaningful 
bearing on policy design (Baldwin-Edwards et al. 2019; Héran 
2020). Researchers have even expressed concerns that findings of the 
migration research funded by the EU are disregarded by the EU’s own 
policy processes (Kalir and Cantat 2020). In this light, the constant drive 
under migration management processes for “more and better data” can 
have the counterproductive effect of ignoring already well-established 
knowledge in migration research—whether quantitative or based on 
other methods. 
Conclusion
Estimates of climate migration numbers present a facade of objective, 
authoritative and unemotional facts. But these numbers are highly 
contentious. Such estimates need to be recognised as being grounded in 
normative, epistemological and methodological assumptions which are 
often hidden and rarely challenged. At the very least, migration scholars 
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should expose these assumptions so that audiences better understand 
how migration numbers are constructed (for a recent example, see 
McMichael et al. 2020). In many cases, the estimates of people moving 
in the context of climate change are methodologically questionable or 
else nebulous. 
Migration numbers need to be understood against this background. 
But they also do not stand alone. They are attached to various narratives 
and are presented in multiple ways. Even rigorous, cautiously 
communicated estimates can become decoupled from the complexities 
of human mobilities. The significance of a discourse is not simply about 
how it is constructed, and by whom, but also lies in how the discourse is 
received, and how the narratives which package migration numbers are 
filtered and interpreted. Complexities that may initially be presented 
alongside the numerical estimates become erased. Numbers alone 
become the headline, thus distracting from important political questions 
about humanity, justice, and responsibility.
A common narrative with which climate migration estimates are 
coupled (either by their authors or during their reproduction and 
dissemination) is one that conceptualises human mobility in the 
context of climate change as a crisis. The large numbers of people 
imagined to be on the move are employed to signify the looming crisis 
and used to invoke urgent action. There comes a point where these 
numbers are instrumentalised by political movements whose values—
expressed in xenophobic narratives and anti-immigrant agendas—are 
at odds with those who champion these numbers to call for bolder 
climate action. 
The relationship between climate change and human mobility 
should not be seen as a security problem, as a managerial issue, or as a 
number to be controlled. The policy focus should be on people—their 
vulnerabilities, rights and freedoms—so as to help prise open political 
spaces for policy interventions beyond building walls, real or rhetorical, 
designed to control rather than to care.
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